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WHAT IS A GIFT?
HERBERT RAND*
When Don Quixote tilted with the windmills, he could rely
upon one favorable constant :-the mill-sails whirled with the
wind in only one direction, and our Knight-errant could there-
fore brace himself for the shock of collision. What if the mill
were so erratic that its arms could at any moment turn in re-
verse; if some of its arms could turn counter to the others; and
if, at the same time, any of them could bend over with terrifying
suddenness and deal a direct blow? Might not our hero have
felt that this form of combat was "too dreadful and unequal" to
be encountered? The taxpayer in his quest for victory before
the Supreme Court finds himself engaged in just such combat,
for the Court's sudden reversal of trend and its conflicting
statutory interpretations are in many cases quite unpredictable.,
Indeed, the odds in favor of "the educated guess" have reached
a new low.
The decisions of Commissioner v. Wemyss 2 and its compan-
ion case of Merrill v. Fahs3 contain many surprises and are ex-
cellent examples of judicial legislation by resort to unorthodox
statutory interpretation. Ir. Justice Frankfurter wrote the
opinions of the Court and characterized the Merrill decision as
being an effort to bar "another and needless complexity" from
being introduced into "this already irksome situation." The
Court succeeded in its immediate object, but it remains to be
seen whether it has not created the basis for a host of new tax
problems even more complex and irksome than those from which
it sought escape.
The WV )nyss and Merrill decisions will cause no social tur-
moil. They will come as a shock to those unfortunates whose
:' A.B., College of the City of New York; LL.B., Brooklyn Law
School of St. Lavrence University, 1930. Address: Kaye, Scholer,
Fierman & Hays, 149 Broadway, New York, N. Y.
'For example of reversal of trend: More than one state may tax
intangibles. Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189 (1903); overruled:
Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minn., 280 U. S. 204 (1929); reinstated:
State Tax Comm. of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U. S. 174 (1942).
'324 U. S. 303, (1945).
-'324 U. S. 308, (1945).
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transactions will be retroactively affected tax-wise.4  Moreover,
the lay citizen not so affected could be expected to applaud the
collection of a tax from a person who presumably could afford to
make a large gift. He might feel, as did the Tax Court, that the
taxation as a gift of the transfer by a wealthy man of a substan-
tial portion of his property to his intended spouse, is reasonably
necessary to prevent evasion. 5 He might even feel that the Su-
preme Court was justified in taxing Wemyss and Mlerrill, even
though they were not "tax dodgers," for the in terrorimi effect
which the decisions might have on other taxpayers with less pure
motives.
Judicial legislation to fill a small gap in a tax statute to
protect the revenues, is beyond criticism.0 Similarly, Congres-
sional policy is a proper guide for realistic judicial approach to
prevent tax evasion as in the Gregory case. 7 But where the
Court roams at large and thus usurps the fmction of Congress-
where it ignores the "easy-to-say-so-if-that-is-what-was-meant"
rule of statutory interpretation, and in effect amends the statute
-'the legal profession may be expected to become excited.8
Whenever the Court unhesitatingly creates judicial legislation
as a matter of fiscal policy, it encourages Congressional inertia.
Congress has been "letting George do it," knowing that flexible
administrative regulations and the Court's eagerness to imple-
ment those regulations, result in the largest possible tax receipts.9
Confusion in the tax field favors the Government, rather
than the taxpayer, so long as statutes are no longer strictly con-
strued in favor of the taxpayer.' 0
4 Snyder, Retrospective Operation of Overruling Decisions (1940)
35 ILL L. REV. 121
Wemyss, 2 T. C. 876, 882.
"Judicial Law is one of the facts of life, and an inescapable
necessary one." See Commr. v. Beck, 129 F. (2d) 243, 245 (C. C. A.
2d, 1941).
'Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465 (1935).
'Commr. v. Beck, Supra, Note 6. A plaintive note is struck by
the Justice writing the dissenting opinion in Matter of Wemyss,
2 T. C. 876 at 885. He makes the plea "Why not take the law as
we find it?"
'The court is at times more tax conscious than Congress. The
decision of Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154 (1942) was rejected
by Congress in Sec. 167(c) I. R. C. added by Sec. 134 (a) Revenue
Act of 1943.
The rule of strict statutory construction resolving doubts in
favor of the taxpayer, has been pigeon-holed. See Note (1943) 56
HARV. L. REV. 1142.
WHAT Is A GIFT?
We seem to be heading in the direction of a case system of
tax administration in which each decision would merely add
a patch to the crazy quilt which is our present body of tax
statutes.1
The "average citizen" (and more and more often, the ex-
pert) can no longer decide whether or not an intended bona fide
act will result in tax liability. If he elects to act, he may be
forced as a practical matter, to accede to the Treasury's demand
for a tax, because the courts may generally be expected to re-
solve the doubt in favor of the Treasury. Our tax laws are
therefore as effective-and need one say, as unpopular-as a
statute of Caligula, who wrote his laws in small characters and
hung them upon high pillars, the better to ensnare his subjects.
By thus increasing the power of the Treasury, the Court ac-
celerates the shift to administrative law.1
2
The Court is loath to admit that it legislates and that the law
would not have moved but for the impetus of the Court's
nudge. 13 This article it* written under the assumption that it is
the duty of the legal fraternity to raise a voice of protest when-
ever a court judicially legislates in the tax field through the
medium of statutory construction, no matter whether it be re-
garded as good or bad legislation from the fiscal or social point
of view.14
As the jester's gibes served the king by reminding him that
he was only the king, each lawyer and student can serve the
Court by reminding it that it is not the Legislature.
"See Nash, What Law of Taxation? (1940) 9 FORD. L. REV. 165.
The dangers of the shift to administrative law are pointed out
by Henderson (president, American Bar Assn.), "Making secure 'the
pleasures of liberty' ", Reports of American Bar Assn., Vol. 69 (1944).
On the other hand this shift is regarded by some as a desirable
alternative to judicial chaos and in the ultimate interests of the
taxpayer. Eisenstein, Some Iconoclastic Reflections on Tax Admin-
istration (1945) 58 HAMv. L. REV. 477,524-47.
1' "We of the teaching world are still as full of our discovery as
once was tortured Galileo; move, move it does, the law." K. N.
LLEWELLYN, TaE BRAMBLEBUSH (1930), p. 128.
"Another writer, commenting on the Wemyss and Merrill cases,
ends an article on this note of resignation: "Lawyers should employ
their energies to inquire into the wisdom of a particular instance
of judicial legislation, rather than to bewail the inevitable." Cahn,
Contract or Gift? (1945) 80 TRUSTS AND ESTATES, 489, 493.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
THE LEGAL BACKGROUND OF THE QUESTION
The gift tax statute refers to transfers of property "by
gift." 15  It also provides that if "property is transferred for
less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth, then the amount by which the value of the property ex-
ceeded the value of the consideration shall * * * be deemed a
gift * * * ,,16
Neither the Internal Revenue Code nor the Regulations de-
fine the word "gift."' 1  It has been held that what is a gift for
purposes of the gift tax, may not be a gift for purposes of the
estate tax, and again, a gift for income tax purposes may be
something quite different.' s The case reports have described
certain elements of a gift, but they give no clear and unequivocal
definition. Under Common Law concepts, a gift was one of the
methods of transferring property. It differed from other
methods of transferring title, in that it was always gratuitous.' 9
The determination of whether a transfer is gratuitous is tied
up with the factor of donative intent. It has been said that "the
concept of a taxable gift involves inquiry into what goes on in the
mind of the donor." ' 20 Let us see what the Supreme Court has
had to say on this subject in some of its recent cases.
In Bogardus v. Comntissioner2' the Court had to decide
whether a bonus to employees was taxable income of the tax-
payer, or a gift. It decided that "intention must govern" and
that the facts in that case showed an intent to make a gift. The
four dissenting Justices, in an opinion written by Mr. Justice
Brandeis, were in agreement with the majority that intention of
the donor was the controlling factor, but they felt that the judg-
ment of the Board of Tax Appeals on ,the question of fact should
not have been disturbed.
Helvering v. Fuller-22 indicated that no gift was involved in
a payment in discharge of a marital obligation.
I. R. C. Sec. 1000 (b); 1932 Act, Sec. 501(b).
I. R. C. Sec. 1002; 1932 Act, Sec. 503.'
'7See Reg. 79 (1936 ed.) and present Reg. 108.
Commr. v. Beck, 129 F. (2d) 243 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942); Higgins v.
Commr., 129 F. (2d) 237 (C. C. A. 1st, 1942).
""BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES (Sharswood ed.), pp. 706. 737.
PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE & GIFT TAXATION (1942), p. 1124. See
also, p. 1070, id. to the effect that one of the constituent elements of
a gift is subjective.
2- 302 U. S. 34 (1937).
- 310 U. S. 69 (1940).
WHAT Is A GIFT?
In HIevteremly v. Americani Dental Co.23 the Court said that
the "plain meaning" of the word "gift" as used in Section 22
(b) (3) is "receipt of financial advantages gratuitously" and
refused to determine that a debtor had realized taxable income
for a creditor's gratuitous cancellation of a debt. Judge Frank-
furter, dissenting, pointed out that the Tax Court had found that
donative intent, necessary for a gift, was lacking. He suggested
that it was wise "fiscal as well as judicial administration" to
uphold the Tax Court's finding.
In1 1939 Randolph Paul wrote that "under the present law
there would appear to be no taxable gift under such a case
(lump sum marital settlement which completely discharges the
husband's obligation), since the parties are usually dealing at
arm's length and a donative intent seems lacking." He stated
that a taxible gift in such a case is "hardly imaginable unless
the transferred corpus substantially exceeds the then value of
the marital rights surrendered. 2 4
With this brief review we proceed to a consideration of the
two cases under discussion.
THE WEMYSS2 5 AND AERRILL 2 6 CASES
In both of these recent cases, the Court had to consider the
meaning of the word "gift" as used in Chapter 4 (Gift Tax) of
Sub-Title A of the Internal Revenue Code.2 7 The Court rejected
the "plain" or "colloquial" or "simpliciter" meaning which it
had theretofore ascribed to the word on other occasions, some
of which are referred to above. It held that Congress had in-
tended the word to have the "broadest and most comprehensive
meaning;" it eliminated certain standards for determining
whether a gift had been made, which theretofore had been re-
garded as important, if not controlling; it taught us that prior
prevalent notions as to the meaning of consideration were no
longer tenable in the gift tax field; it evolved a mechanical
'318 U. S. 321, 330.
24 Paul, Five Years with Douglas v. Willcuts (1939) 53 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 34.
- 324 U. S. 303 (1945).
'324 U. S. 308 (1945).
Sec. 1000 et seq. I. R. C. The opinions in these cases refer to
Sections 501 and 503 of the Rev. Act of (June 6) 1932. The corre-
sponding sections as numbered in the I. R. C. are used in this dis-
cussion.
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method for solving the problem by providing (in effect) a
mathematical formula (an over-simplification, of which more
will be said below) for resolving the question of what is a gift ;-
but left that question otherwise unanswered.
Both cases had somewhat similar facts. Each taxpayer, a
man in his fifties, was contemplating matrimony. The taxpayers
and,.their respective fiancees were represented by separate inde-
pendent counsel and the transaction in each case was free from
donative intent in the colloquial sense of the word. Pursuant to
prenuptial contract, each husband made a transfer to his wife.
In each case there was consideration for the transfer under con-
ventional common law concepts. Each wife acqulred rights under
the contract which could have been enforced in a court of law
if the husband had failed to make the stipulated transfer. In
neither case was there any suggestion of a tax avoidance motive.
Nevertheless, in each case the transaction was held to be a gift.
In the Wernyss case the taxpayer transferred property
amounting to aproximately $140,000 to his wife, following the
consummation of their marriage, pursuant to a prenuptial con-
tract. The purpose of the transfer was to compensate her for her
prospective loss of income of about $5500 a year payable during
her widowhood under an existing trust made by her deceased
former husband. Her agreement to marry was a real and sub-
stantial detriment to her because of her resulting loss of income.
Merrill, a Florida resident, owned property having a value
of over $5,300,000 of which $135,000 represented Florida real
estate. Under Florida law, Merrill's wife would, upon the mar-
riage, acquire an in6hoate dower interest in his real and personal
property, which (at least to the extent of his real estate) would
have curtailed his right to sell without the consent of his wife.
He had been twice married before and had had financial difficul-
ties with a prior wife. In the opinion of the dissenting Circuit
Court Judge, the $300,000 which Merrill paid out secured to him
free control of assets worth at that time in excess of $1,700,000
-as the dissenting Judge Waller said: "no mere bagatelle"-
in addition to a number of non-material satisfactions. As was
said in the case of Lasker v. Commissioner,2 8 a somewhat similar
case, "certainly he was not short-changed."
- 138 F. (2d) 989.
WHAT Is A GIFT?
In order to support the decisions that both the Wemyss and
Merrill transactions were taxable gifts, the Court held in effect
that for purposes of the gift tax laws:
(1) the search for "donative intent" is not a proper test;
(2) "adequate and full consideration" refers to benefits
actually received by the donor and not detriment suffered by the
donee;
(:3) the relinquishment of dower or marital rights can never
constitute adequate and full consideration "in money or money's
worth."
One need not read between the lines to discover that the
Court was more concerned with policy considerations than with
a strict interpretation of the statutes involved. It says so. Its
justification for both decisions is that "to hold otherwise would
encourage tax avoidance." In carrying out that policy it fused
Sections 1000 and 1002 of the Internal Revenue Code and
stretched that combination to include, with modifications, express
provisions found only in those sections of the Code which deal
exclusively with the estate tax.
Comparison of the statute as written, with the "effective
statute" resulting from the interpretation by the Court, illus-
trates the lengths to which a court can go in tearing down, re-
building, altering and remodeling a statute.29 Only the last sen-
'A "before-and-after" comparison, showing in italics, effective
changes in or additions (as viewed by the author) to original
statute made by the Wemyss and Merrill decisions:
I. R. C. 1000. IMPOSITION OF' TAX. (a) For the calendar
year 1940 and each calendar year thereafter a tax * * * shall
be imposed upon the transfer during such calendar year by any
individual, resident or non-resident, of property by "gift" as
defined in Section 100? of this Chapter. ' * *- (b) The tax
shall apply whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise,
whether the "gift" is direct or indirect and whether the property
is real or personal, tangible or intangible; - -
I. R. C. 1002. DEFINITION. Where property is transferred for
less than adequate and full consideration received by the trans-
feror "in money or money's worth" as hereinafter defined, then
the amount by which the value of the property exceeded the
value of the consideration in "money or money's worth" received
therefor by the transferor shall, for the purposes of the tax im-
posed by this Chapter be deemed a "gift," and shall be included
in computing the amount of "gifts" made during the calendar
year. For the purposes of this Chapter a relinquishment or
promised relinquishment of dower, curtesy, or of a statutory
estate created in lieu of dower or curtesy, or of other marital
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tence of the "effective statute" is directly attributable to the
Merrill case. The other changes stem from the Wernyss case.
Since the same thread of fiscal policy runs through both cases,
they will be treated as one, except where development of the
theme requires separate consideration.
DONATIVE INTENT
To a Court which strains to help collect the taxes, the test
for a gift is workable only if it is the most efficient tool for the
desired end. Small wonder then that the Court dispensed with
donative intent and said: "Congress chose not to require ascer-
tainment of what too often is an elusive state of mind. It formu-
lated a much more workable external test."
It seems fair to observe that the taxpayers' states of mind
were considerably less elusive than was the so-called "intention"
of Congress. We read in the Senate Committee Reports that the
transfers reached by gift tax should be those made "donative-
ly."s° Perhaps the Court regarded this as double-talk. But it is
clear that both Merrill and Wemyss lacked donative intent.
'Donative Intent" was the troublesome gremlin who all too
often disrupted the Court's orderly thinking in gift tax cases.
The gremlin was therefore officially banished in the W1emyss
decision. But he is still there, peeping from between the lines
and grinning at the Court. Neither of these cases, and few gift
tax cases, can be decided without him, unless one chooses-as the
Court did-to ignore the obvious. This is so because the Treasury
has not contended that the statute must be generally applied
literally. The Regulations exclude "a transaction which is boza
fide, at arm's length and free from any donative intent.'"31 Even
rights in the transferor's property or estate, shall not be con-
sidered to any extent a consideration "in money or money's
worth."
(NOTE: Omissions indicated by asterisks Aleemed irrelevant to
this discussion; quotation marks not in original statute; the heading
of Sec. 1002 in the original is: "Transfers for less than adequate and
full consideration"; the last sentence in the "effective statute" is
transposed from Sec. 812(b) I. R. C. (Estate Tax) with two substi-
tutions, viz.: "Chapter" for "Subchapter", and "transferor's" for
"decedent's").
'Senate Report No. 665, 72nd Congresi, 1st Session, p. 41.
3 Reg. 108 Sec. 86.8; see also Reg. 79 (1936 ed.) appearing as foot
note to present Reg. 108, Sec. 86.1 extending the gift tax to transfers
of property "to the extent that they are donative in character".
WHAT Is A GIFT?
the present Court does not ascribe to Congress the desire to hit
business transactions which are bad bargains as, for example,
where there is a disparity between the value of the property sold
and the consideration. But there is no doubt that, given a case of
a bad bargain coupled with donative intent, the Treasury would
contend and the Court would find that a gift was made. What
test does one apply to exclude a transfer as "donative" or as
"bone fide" or as a "business transaction within the meaning of
ordinary speech," if not the subjective test of donative intent?
The finding of fact made by the Tax Court in the Wemyss case
was that the transfer was not made in the ordinary course of
business. It is conceivable that the Tax Court might have made
a contrary finding of fact as did the Circuit Court of Appeals,
which saw an arm's length bargain and an absence of donative
intent. Whenever the facts bring the case into that shadowy
zone of bona fides-where it is difficult to see whether what has
all the appearances of a business transaction is one in fact-,
the Courts will be in the embarrassing situation of having to
consider a factor which the Supreme Court says they must
disregard.
3 "
There is nothing in Section 1000 I.R.C. to indicate that Con-
gres; intended an objective test, as distinguished from a sub-
jective test. Section 1002 which relates to transfers for less than
adequate and full consideration, applies to tax transfers which
are not gifts simpliciter because made for a consideration. As to
these, Congress plainly indicated that they would be construc-
tively deemed gifts to the extent of the inadequacy of the con-
sideration. It is difficult to justify treating these two sections as
one, where Congress created them separately. However, the Tax
Court approached this problem pragmatically by "fusing" both
'A transaction between close relatives on a bargain basis may
be made in the ordinary course of business. It may or may not be
partially a gift, depending upon whether or not there is donative
intent. Query: Can a transaction which is non-commercial be said
to be "in the ordinary course of business" as defined by the Regula-
tions in any case where the parties dealt at arm's length in good
faith and lacked donative intent? Compare majority opinion in the
Merrill case which indicates a negative answer, with the minority
opinion by Mr. Justice Reed who approves the trial court's finding
that the transaction was in good faith and "for business reasons."
Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U. S. 184, 188 (1943) may contain a clue
to the answer. The Court considered "the moving impulse" of the
donor and was unable to conceive of this as "even approaching a
transaction 'in the ordinary course of business.'"
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sections, and the Supreme Court gave its blessing to the union.
Having united the sections, it became a simple matter to ascribe
to Congress a single external test, in lieu of the subjective test
which might have seemed appropriate in the application of a
dis-united Section 1000.
Neither Congress nor the Courts have heretofore indicated
any serious concern over the fact that the ascertainment of
elusive states of mind, such as motive and intent, renders the
administration of the tax laws "complex and irksome." For ex-
ample, the privisions of the Code aimed at preventing the ac-
cumlation of corporate surpluses through the device of "incorpo-
rated pocket-book" require proof of the "state of mind of those
persons responsible for the formation and operation" of a corpo-
ration.33 _2Motive determines whether or not a transfer was made
in contemplation of death.
34
The Supreme Court itself has complicated the field of tax
law by numerous decisions which prescribe subjective tests, the
most well known of them being the Gregory case 35 which subjects
all transactions to the test of motive and intent in the quest for
"a real business purpose." In a contemplation of death ease
which was decided shortly before the Wemyss and Merrill eases,
the Court, with no apparent difficulty, specifically imputed mo-
tive (of the incompetent) to the committee of the incompetent
as to transactions made by the committee acting under orders
of the State Court.
3 0
Referring to the fact that donative intent is not mentioned
in the gift tax statutes, an eminent tax authority writes: "Not-
withstanding the absence of the requirement of donative intent
in the case of such transfers in the statute itself, the Commis-
sioner has very sensibly incorporated this requirement in his
Regulations. Entering upon the shifting sands of subjective dona-
tive intent in these cases probably entails no greater difficulties
of proof than does the delusively objective questions of equality
as between the property transferred and the consideration
paid," 3 7
C. H. Spitzner & Sons, Inc., 37 B. T. A. 511,
"Sec. 811(c), I. R. C., estate tax.
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465 (1935).
City Bank v. McGowan, 323 U. S. 594 (1945).
'-'PAUL, SELECTED, STUDIES iN FEDERAL TAX, 2d Series, p. 255 et seq.
WHAT Is A GIFT?
The last word has not yet been said by the Court (or by
Congress) on the subject of donative intent. The gremlin so cere-
moniously banished-but who, to those in on the secret, never
left-may well be expected to be restored to grace. Why? Be-
cause he is a good gremlin when he helps to collect the tax.
THE MEANING OF CONSIDERATION
This brings us to the point of considering that part of the
Supreme Court's decisions which made short shrift of the detri-
ment as consideration for the purpose of the gift tax. Neither the
gift tax laws nor the related regulations define "consideration."
The 1924 Gift Tax Act required that the consideration should be
"received" by the transferor. When the Act reappeared in the
law of 1932, the word "received" was omitted. The Regulations
were silent, but the Treasury insisted that the transferor receive
consideration. But for one important exception,3" the Bristol
case, which the Tax Court had consistently refused to follow, the
courts have generally held that any consideration sufficient to
support an ordinary contract would suffice to take the transaction
out of the gift tax law even though the consideration was not
received 3i' by the transferor.
The Supreme Court followed the Bristol case in holding
that the value of the property or rights given up by the trans-
feree was irrelevant, the test being what the transferor received.
In the Wemyss case the Court presumed that "it will hardly
be suggested" that Congress, in reimposing the gift tax in 1932
and deleting the express requirement that consideration must be
r)cched, meant to exclude transfers that would have been taxed
under the 1924 Act. It was too late, of course, for the taxpayer
to answer the challenge.4'1 The writer should like to answer it
for him.
The writer ventures to suggest that one reasonable explana-
tion why Congress omitted the word "received" in reimposing
" Commr. v. Bristol, 121 F. (2d) 129 (C. C. A. 1st, 1941); rev.
42 B. T. A. 263.
" The word "received" is intended to refer to a case where the
transferor replaces the transferred property with money or property
of equal value. Under common law concepts, the performance of an
act or payment to someone other than the transferor, if bargained
for, would be good consideration for the transfer.
The court of "ultimate conjecture" has bid for the title:
"Court of last retort."
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the gift tax is that it intended that the test for "consideration"
in the gift tax field should not be more onerous than the test for
consideration (viz: benefit or detriment) to support the deducti-
bility of a claim in the estate tax field.
For example, a claim may be deductible from the estate,
even though the consideration in money or money's worth is not
received by the decedent. In other words, either detriment or
benefit may constitute the consideration to authorize the deduc-
tion; provided, of course, that the consideration is not the relin-
quishment of dower or other marital rights in the decedent's
property or estate which, under Section 812(b) I.R.C. may not
be considered for estate tax purposes as consideration in "money
or money's worth. "'41
A second possible explanation for the omission of the word
"received" from the gift tax statute may lie in the fact that
transfers by gift between 1926 and the effective date of the 1932
Act, would have been free of the gift tax, there being no taxing
statute then in effect. This suggests that the omission of the word
"received" in the re-enactment of the 'gift tax, may indicate
that Congress was satisfied to take "half a loaf," as it would
have been entitled to nothing before.
THE MEANING OF "ETC."
Having dispensed with the test of donative intent and hav-
ing enunciated the rule that consideration for gift tax purposes
must be regarded from the point of view of physical receipt, the
Court had one last hurdle to surmount, viz: the meaning of "in
money or money's worth," for gift tax purposes. Practically
speaking, Merrill actually received property upon the relinquish-
ment by his wife of her dower rights. This might not have been
true if he were a resident of New York and if the property had
been acquired on or after September 1, 1930, when dower was
abolished prospectively. Being a Florida resident, Merrill could
not convey good title unless his wife signed the deed. She might
refuse unless she were paid in cash for the value of her property
right. The lower courts have had no difficulty in determining that
"Matter of Jeptha H. Wade, 21 B. T. A. 339; Commr. v. Porter,
92 F. (2d) 426; U. S. v. Mitchell, 74 F. (2d) 571; Commr. v. Kelly,
84 F. (2d) 958, cert. den. 299 U. S. 603.
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a relinquishment of marital rights is property which could con-
stitute adequate consideration for transfer by a husband.
4 2
Assume, for the moment, that Merrill, following his mar-
riage, had transferred all of his real estate plus the sum of
*300,000 to a corporation in exchange for all of its capital stock,
under circumstances negativing any tax avoidance motive. As-
sume further, that 'Mrs. Merrill had thereafter released her dower
rights in the real estate to the corporation for $300,000 in an
arm's length transaction. Could it be said that the corporation
did not "receive" adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth '?4 3 The Circuit Court's opinion indicates that the
value of Mrs. Merrill's rights far exceeded the sum of $300,000
which she received in exchange.
Merrill could be liable for a gift tax only if the words
"money or money's worth" could be construed to exclude a
relinquishment of dower rights.
Treasury Regulations 79 (1936 ed.): Art. 8 provide: "A
consideration not reducible to a money value, as love and affec-
tion, promise of marriage, etc., is to be wholly disregarded and
the entire value of the property transferred constitutes the
amount of the gift." The statute (Sec. 1000 et seq I.R.C.) does
not exclude relinquishment of dower as a consideration "in
money or money's worth." In fact, it is entirely silent on this
subject. That neither love and affection nor promise of marriage
is reducible to a money value (at least, for tax purposes) is not
open to question. But dower, curtesy, or statutory rights created
in lieu thereof, and a relinquishment of any of them, are reduci-
ble to money value, and the Court states that it has been so held.
"Lasker v. Commr., 138 F. (2d) 989.
"When the wife's concurrence in a deed is necessary to convey a
marketable title and she is unwilling to surrender her right of dower
without consideration, it would seem that her transfer to her hus-
band of the portion of the purchase price represented by her dower
interest would be a surrender of a present right having a pecuniary
value sufficient to cause the allowance of her claim against his
estate. Under such circumstances, the consideration for the hus-
band's promise would not be the relinquishment of her dower
interest but the relinquishment of a completed right in an arm's
length exchange involving an intermediary." MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL
TAXES ON ESTATES, TRUSTS AND GIFTS (1944 ed.).
' Since transfers by a corporation are not subject to gift tax,
would this have been a legitimate method of tax avoidance in the
Merrill case, so far as Mr. Merrill was concerned?
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Because they were reducible to money value, it was necessary for
Congress to exclude the relinquishment of such rights from the
definition of consideration "in money or money's worth" for
purposes of the estate tax.
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The Court has in effect expanded the text of the Treasury
Regulations by interpreting the word "etc." ,to include a relin-
quishment of dower, curtesy and statutory and other marital
rights created in lieu thereof. The nature of the items read into
the Regulations in place of the word "etc." is such, that they are
reducible to money value, whereas the items preceding the
word "etc." are not. Thus the Court has put the axe to another
ancient rule, that of ejusdern generis.
Despite its pragmatic approach, the Court couched its deci-
sion in the classical manner-on precedent. It said that its "guid-
ing light" was Sanford v. Commissioner, 4  a case which has
evoked much criticism. It has been said that "the rationale of
the Sanford case not only postpones the payment of the gift tax
on completed gifts, but also appears to create obvious loop-holes
by which one can avoid the high brackets of the income tax. "'4
The question before the Court in the Sanford case was
whether a donor could be taxed for an inter vivos transfer which
he could modify by changing the beneficiaries, but which he could
not recall for his own benefit. It was certain that the property
would be included in his gross estate. The Court said that Con-
gress had no purpose to tax uncompleted gifts and that the test
of completeness for the gift tax was the same as that to be applied
in determining whether the property would be subject to the
estate tax at the death of the donor. If the gift was incomplete,
the "Government would get its due" later on, in the form of the
more onerous estate tax.
Lest anyone be misled by the description "guiding light,"
the Court does not use the Sanford case as a pillar of fire to be
'Sec. 812(b) I. R. C.
308 U. S. 39 (1939).
SWarren, Correlation of Gift & Estate Taxes (1941) 55 HARV.
L. R~v. 1, 20. The same author pointed out that under the Sanford
case "a wealthy man by the device of an irrevocable gift in trust
subject to a reserve power to change the beneficiaries, may make
large transfers in trust and accomplish very large income tax savings
without having to pay a gift tax on the transfer in trust. Such a result
tends to encourage flagrant income tax avoidance and make the gift
tax laws productive of revenue." He stated that a reconsideration
by the Supreme Court appears desirable. (pp. 22 and 23).
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fclowed from afar, but as a dark-lantern whose light can be
controlled at will from a beam to a glimmer.
When another taxpayer 47 interpreted the Sanford case as a
general policy against allowing the same property to be taxed
both as an estate and as a gift, the Court was prompt to disabuse
him of that impression. The Court then said that the gift was
"a form of down payment on the estate tax" for the eventual
payment of the latter, and that Congress had provided this plan
for integrating the estate and gift taxes.
As has been indicated above, MKerrill's liability turned upon
the meaning of the words "an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth." Those words are also found in the
estate tax laws. The Court said that the meaning ascribed to
those words in the estate tax laws must be adopted as the meaning
of the words in the gift tax laws. The Sanford decision was use-
ful to the Court because of the following language: "The gift tax
was supplementary to the estate tax. The two are in pari materia
and must be construed together."
The rationale of the Wemyss and Merrill cases seems to be
that the Treasury is entitled to at least "one bite of the cherry."
It supports the theory that a "severance tax" at gift tax rates is
due whenever the effect of a transfer would be to reduce the gross
taxable estate of the transferor were he to die immediately after
the transfer, and that the measure of the tax is the net amont
of the severance.
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Assume that H, a husband, transfers $100,000 under an
irrevocable unamendable trust providing that all income be paid
to the settlor for life, the remainder to be paid upon his death to
W, his wife. Assume also that the consideration for the transfer
is a release of dower. The prospective estate of H has suffered
no severance because the entire corpus of the trust will be sub-
ject to estate tax. 49. Nevertheless, the Court would hold that a
17 Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U. S. 176 (1942). See also com-
panion case, Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U. S. 184 (1942).
" The Wemyss case speaks of transfers "which are withdrawn
from the donor's estate". The words "severance tax" are not to be
found in the Wemyss and Merrill cases or in the I. R. C. They have
been coined by the writer, as an aid, to denote a substitutional tax to
prevent avoidance of another (in this case, estate) tax. For example,
a local sales tax is generally supplemented by a substitutional use
tax applicable to property purchased outside the taxing jurisdiction
for use therein.
"Sec. 811(c), I. R. C.
L. J.-3
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gift had been made, because no consideration was received by
H "in money or money's worth." The Treasury gets two bites
of the cherry this time. It is obvious that the policy supporting
the imposition of a severance tax, is a policy of convenience emi-
nently suited to the facts in the Wemyss and Merrill cases, which
involved outright transfers. The fact that there has been no
severance will not protect the taxpayer from the gift tax.5'1
A "WORKABLE" EXTERNAL TEST
It has been often said that there is a judicial trend toward
simplification. In the Wemyss and Merrill decisions the Court
has given us simplification with a vengeance. It has given us, in
effect, a formula which, if applied according to its rules, calcu-
lates the measure of the tax mechanically. This may be illus-
trated by means of an example: H, a husband with donative in-
tent, transfers property worth $100,000 to W, his wife, receiving
in exchange property worth $20,000. The symbols to be used
in the formula and the rules for use of the symbols, are:
Symbols Meaning Rules qualifying use of symbols.
T Property transferred. No restriction.
C Consideration for transfer. Include only property physically
received having a money value;
use zero for any of the follow-
ing: Release of dower; curtesy;
statutory estates in lieu there-
of; marital rights.
G Amount of gift. No restriction.
Formula: T - C = G.
The amount of the gift made by H, applying the formula
to the example, is of course, $80,000. If we change the example
so that the consideration for the transfer of $100,000 is a release
of dower, a grammar-school child could compute the amount of
the gift at $100,000.
Now we shall apply the formula to W as the transferor,
mindful that "Congress * * * dispensed with the test of donative
intent." Assuming that W's dower rights are worth $300,000,
the computation of the amount of the gift would be: $300,000-
$100,000=$200,000. Thus, H has made a taxable gift to W of
$100,000, and W has made a taxable gift to H of $200,000; all
'Cf. Smith v. Shaughnessy and Robinette v. Helvering, Supra,
n. 47.
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based upon one transfer. That paradoxical situation results if the
formula is applied from the viewpoint of each party to a transac-
tion, whenever all or part of the consideration for the transfer
is susceptible of valuation but is not reducible to "money or
money's worth" under the Wemyss and Merrill decisions. Like
the Sorcerer's apprentice who wove the spell compelling the
broom to fetch water, but did not know the magic words to make
it stop, the Court must find (or Congress must supply) the words
to keep the formula from operating on both sides of a transaction.
Perhaps when those words are uttered, we shall find that they
are no other than "dowtihe intent."
CONCLUSION
In a desire to curb tax avoidance in situations similar to
those in the Wenzyss and Merrill cases, and to simplify the gift
tax laws, the Court has created a series of perplexing problems.
What treatment may the taxpayer expect in the case of lump
sum marital settlements, in the light of these decisions? It is
apparent that the presence of donative intent in the transaction
will subject the transferor to gift tax. However, the absence of
donative intent will be of no consequence.
A transfer pursuant to an ante-nuptial agreement with an
intended spouse, in consideration of the release of marital rights
in the husband's property or estate, will subject the transferor
to gift tax. But what about a bona fide transfer made at arm's
length by an estranged husband to his wife in the course of a
settlement looking toward divorce, in complete discharge of the
wife's right to support ?' Will the courts continue to hold that
such a transfer is made "in the ordinary course of business"
and that the right to support is full and adequate consideration
in money's worth, even though a release of dower rights would
be insufficient? Or will the courts disregard the value of that
right fixed by agreement, unless payment is made under a spe-
cific award in a divorce decree subsequently entered ?52
" Treas. Regulations do not state whether lump sum alimony
settlements may constitute consideration "in money or money's
worth." Reg. 79, Art. 8 (1936 ed.); same as present Reg. 108, Sec.
86.8.
-'Matter of Herbert Jones, 1 T. C. 1207, decided prior to
Wemyss-Merrill; the Tax Court refused to make such a distinction.
Matter of Jones, followed by Tax Court in Converse 5 T. C. (No.
123) dec. after Wemyss-Merrill.
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Because of lack of correlation between the income, gift and
estate taxes, if the property transferred pursuant to separation
agreement consists of securities having a higher market value
than the donor's adjusted cost base, the transaction may be con-
sidered a gift under the doctrine of the Merrill case, because the
consideration is a release of marital right; but the Treasury
might contend that he had realized a gain, income tax wise, in
using the securities to discharge his obligations to his wife.5
3
'Whether the Supreme Court under the Dobson case5
4 will
freely permit the Supreme Court to decide these questions, can
be answered only by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
will not hesitate to reverse the Tax Court where it disagrees for
reasons of policy.55
The necessity for legislative intervention for correlation of
gift tax and estate tax, is recognized by the Court in the Merrill
case. It is doubtful whether such correlation would offer an ade-
quate solution unless it was coupled with a correlation of the
income tax laws as well. Proposals have been made for piece-meal
correction of the situation.50 A general and complete overhauling
of the estate, gift and income taxes is necessary. An adequate
treatment of the problems such as those which result from deci-
sions like Wemyss and Merrill, may also require that the Treas-
ury be given broader administrative authority under which it
could implement the law with full and comprehensive regulations
which it would uniformly follow and which would be entitled
to the respect of the Courts.57 With such regulations, based upon
Commr. v. Halliwell, 131 F. (2d) 642.
320 U. S. 489. The Wemyss case came up through the Tax
Court, whereas the Merrill case originated in the District Court.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter distinguishes the treatment of the two cases
by relying upon a Tax Court finding in the Wemyss case, under the
Dobson theory.
The Supreme Court, on June 4, 1945 split 5-3 on the interpreta-
tion of the Dobson Case. Frankfurter, Roberts and Jackson, J. J.,
favor a broad interpretation which precludes independent re-exam-
ination of the Tax Court's decisions if that Court has given "a fair
answer" on an issue which is "peculiarly within the competence of
the Tax Court to resolve." The other Justices of the Court adhere
to the rule that the Tax Court decision is not final on "clear cut"
questions of law. Bingham v. Comm., 323 U. S., 65 Sup. Ct. 1232
(1945).
" Pavenstedt, Proposal to Eliminate Double Taxation as to Trans-
fers in Contemplation of Death (1944) 54 YALE L. J. 70.
17 See Eisenstein, Some Iconoclastic Reflections on Tax Adminis-
tration (1945) 58 HARV. L. REv. 477.
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properly correlated tax statutes, the Courts should be less in-
clined to operate in the domain of fiscal policy. At that time, the
taxpayer (and his tax counsel) might not have to ponder in vain
over the answer to the question: "What is a gift ?"
HERBERT RAND
